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Abstract
We consider information aggregation in national and local elections when
voters are mobile and might sort themselves into local districts. Using a
standard model of private information for voters in elections in combination
with a New Economic Geography model, agglomeration occurs for economic
reasons whereas voter stratication occurs due to political preferences. We
compare a national election, where full information equivalence is attained,
with local elections in a three-district model. We show that full information
equivalence holds at a stable equilibrium in only one of the three districts
when transportation cost is low. The important comparative static is that full
information equivalence is a casualty of free trade. When trade is more costly,
people tend to agglomerate for economic reasons, resulting in full information
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equivalence in the political sector. Under free trade, people sort themselves
into districts, most of which are polarized, resulting in no full information
equivalence in these districts. We examine the implications of the model using
data on corruption in the legislature of the state of Alabama and in the Japanese
Diet.
Keywords and Phrases: information aggregation in elections, informa-
tive voting, new economic geography, local politics
JEL Classication Numbers: D72, D82, R12
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1 Introduction
We seek to address questions at the boundary of politics and geography: How much
information is revealed in local as opposed to national elections? Does the mobility
of voters help or hinder information aggregation in local elections? Of course, the
electorate is generally smaller in local as opposed to national elections, but does voter
migration for economic reasons result in polarization of local elections? Under what
circumstances do localities, such as cities, become politically polarized?
For an empirical viewpoint, we examine o¢ cials that are elected and later found
to have received outside money that might compromise their votes. Consider the
following data, collected by Couch et al. (1992), on whether Alabama state-elected
o¢ cials received income from serving on boards of local state-funded universities in
1987-1988. House districts are evidently smaller.
Table 1: 22 Contingency Table for Alabamas Legislature
Alabama No Outside Income Outside Income
Senate 31 (88.6%) 4 (11.4%)
House 77 (73.3%) 28 (26.6%)
Sources: Couch et al. (1992), http://www.legislature.state.al.us/
Note that House districts are not necessarily subsets of Senate districts.
2 = 3:46
Degrees of Freedom = 1
Probability = 0:063
From this table we can see that the likelihood that House and Senate members
di¤er in their receipt of outside income is large but not denitive. Could it be that
some elections for the House imply more information aggregation than others?
Next consider members of the Diet in Japan from July 2000 to March 2003. The
Diet is bicameral, the House of Councilors having fewer members than the House of
Representatives.
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Table 2: 22 Contingency Table for Japans Diet1
Japan No Allegations Resigned Under Duress or Convicted
House of Councilors 145 (99.3%) 1 (0.7%)
House of Representatives 289 (96.3%) 11 (3.7%)
Source: http://www.notnet.jp/data04index.htm
Note that House of Representatives districts are subsets of House of Councilors
districts.
2 = 3:33
Degrees of Freedom = 1
Probability = 0:068
Again, there appears to be more corruption in elections involving smaller districts,
but this is not denitive.
To address the theoretical questions we have posed as well as to explain the data,
we formulate a model of politics and information aggregation in elections where voters
are also economic agents and mobile. Geography and politics interact and feed back
in interesting ways: On the one hand, economic factors might cause agglomeration of
agents, thus a¤ecting the polarization of districts, the aggregation of information in
local elections, and the outcomes of local elections. On the other hand, the outcomes
of elections in localities might a¤ect the agglomeration of agents into these localities.
This interplay leads us to the introduction of geography into models of politics, in
particular those associated with the Condorcet jury theorem such as Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997). It also leads us to introduce
politics into models of stratication or agglomeration, such as Krugman (1991). In
this respect, we could have used a model of local public goods for this purpose, but
nd the New Economic Geography model from urban economics to be both more
tractable and less biased toward stratication. For example, in the US context, local
education and quality of schools, along with property taxes, are the most important
criteria used by consumers/voters for determining location of residence. Tiebout
1In the House of Councilors of Japans Diet, 146 of the 242 seats are elected in single-seat districts
and 96 by proportional representation. In the House of Representatives, 300 of the 480 seats are
elected in single-seat districts and 180 by proportional representation.
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sorting models will generally lead directly to stratication by type of consumer in
equilibrium, implying a failure of full information equivalence (dened in the next
paragraph) in the various districts. In summary, we could use a model of equilibrium
in a local public goods economy in place of the New Economic Geography part of our
model, but we conjecture that results would be similar. In general, New Economic
Geography models lead to agglomeration, but not directly to stratication. We shall
elaborate on this in the conclusions.
Our main ndings are summarized as follows. We compare a national election,
where the same outcome is attained whether voters know everyones private infor-
mation or not (called full information equivalence2 in the political science literature),
with local elections in a three district model. We show that full information equiv-
alence holds in only one of the three districts when transportation cost of goods is
low. The important comparative static is that full information equivalence is a ca-
sualty of free trade. When trading goods is more costly, people tend to agglomerate
for economic reasons, resulting in full information equivalence in the political sector.
Under free trade, people sort themselves into districts, two of which are polarized,
resulting in no full information equivalence in these districts. The remaining district
still satises full information equivalence. Thus, if the signals voters receive concern
the conict of interest or corruption of candidates in their district, it is expected that
elections in districts with smaller populations (local elections) will result in a higher
proportion of compromised elected o¢ cials. This might even happen if the electorate
is large, as in our model. But some of these districts will still satisfy full information
equivalence, so the correlation between size of electorate and information aggregation
in elections is imperfect. Nevertheless, our model endogenously generates politically
polarized districts.
The literature on information aggregation in elections has a focus on an electorate
that is exogenously given and thus is immobile. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)
presented the seminal work on the Condorcet jury theorem, showing in a game-
theoretic context that for some states of nature, not all the information of voters is
revealed in Nash equilibrium even if they all have the same objective functions and
priors. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) nd su¢ cient conditions for which full
2Equivalently, it can be said that full information aggregation occurs in the election.
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information equivalence holds at Nash equilibrium, and that is the framework we
employ below.
The literature on economic geography has almost no focus on voting, particularly
when there is asymmetric information about candidates or ballot measures.
We wish to emphasize that one interpretation of the model, specically taking
the uncertainty to be about political corruption, is useful primarily because there are
empirical implications that can be taken to data. Other interpretations of the alter-
natives over which there is uncertainty, for example the e¤ects of policies regarding a
local public good such as schooling, or candidate productivity or valence, are equally
valid and possibly more interesting, but are harder to take to data. This will be
discussed further in the conclusions.
The outline for the balance of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives the model
and denitions of equilibrium and stability. Section 3 contains a characterization of
equilibrium and the comparative statics of the model with a focus on local politics.
Section 4 discusses the general implications of the model, returning to our discussion
of the data. Finally, Section 5 gives our conclusions.
2 The model
The spatial structure of the model consists of three districts indexed by i = 1; 2; 3,
located at each vertex of a regular triangle. These can be cities, regions or jurisdic-
tions within a city. There is an exogenously given mass L > 0 of consumers, each
of whom supplies one unit of labor inelastically. Let the population of district i be
denoted by Li.
The model has a political as well as an economic sector. Overall utility is given
by the sum of subutilities from the two sectors. The utility from the economic sector
for a resident of district i is given by ui, whereas the utility from the political sector
is given by v. The total utility is given by
Ui  ui + v:
We will describe these subutility functions, including their domains, in detail. We
begin by describing the economic sector.
6
2.1 The economic sector
Preferences are dened over a continuum of varieties of a horizontally di¤erentiated
good. The preferences of a typical resident of district i are represented by the
following CES utility:
ui =
"
3X
j=1
 Z

j
dji(!)
" 1
" d!
!# "
" 1
; (1)
where dji(!) is the consumption in district i of variety ! produced in district j, and

j is the set of varieties produced in district j with j = 1; 2; 3. The parameter " > 1
measures both the constant own-price elasticity of demand for any variety, and the
elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. Unlike standard models in the
tradition of New Economic Geography, there is no freely traded homogeneous good.
The freely traded homogeneous good is unrealistic and its presence might not be
innocuous (Davis, 1998).
To explain how the economic sector works, rst x the locations of consumers.
Production of any variety of the di¤erentiated good takes place under increasing
returns to scale by a set of monopolistically competitive rms. This set is endoge-
nously determined in equilibrium by free entry and exit. In what follows, we denote
by ni the mass of rms located in district i. Production of each variety requires
both a xed and a constant marginal labor input requirement, denoted by c and c
respectively. As for transportation costs, inter-district shipments of any variety are
subject to iceberg transportation costs:  ij  1 units have to be shipped from district
i to district j for one unit to reach its destination.
Given our assumptions, in equilibrium rms di¤er only by the district in which
they are located. Accordingly, to simplify notation, we drop the variety label ! from
now on. Let pji be the delivered price of a variety from district j to district i. Then,
the maximization of (1) subject to the budget constraint
3X
j=1
njpjidji = wi (2)
yields the following individual demand in district i for a variety produced in district
j:
dji =
p "ji
P 1 "i
wi; (3)
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where wi is the wage in district i and Pi is the CES price index in district i dened
by:
Pi 
 
3X
k=1
nkp
1 "
ki
! 1
1 "
: (4)
Due to the iceberg transportation cost assumption, a typical rm established in dis-
trict i has to produce qij =  ijdijLj units to satisfy nal demand dij in district j,
where Lj is the number of consumers in district j. The rm takes (3) into account
when maximizing its prot given by:
i =
 
3X
j=1
pijdijLj
!
  wi
 
c
3X
j=1
qij + c
!
: (5)
Prot maximization with respect to pij, taking the price index Pj as given because of
the continuum of varieties, then implies that the price per unit delivered is:
pij =
"c
"  1 ijwi =  ijpii: (6)
Due to free entry and exit, prots must be non-positive in equilibrium. Then
(5) and (6) imply that rmsequilibrium scale of operation in country i must satisfy
i = 0, which is rewritten as:
(pii   cwi)
3X
j=1
 ijdijLj = wic: (7)
Because the labor input is given by c
P3
j=1 qij + c in (5), the labor market clearing
conditions are given by:
ni
 
c
3X
j=1
 ijdijLj + c
!
= Li: (8)
Eliminating pij and
P3
j=1  ijdijLj from (6), (7) and (8), we get:
ni =
Li
"c
: (9)
That is, the number of rms in a district is proportional to the number of workers in
that district at equilibrium.
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Substituting (4), (6) and (9) into the zero prot condition (7), we have:
3X
j=1
ijwjLjP
k kjw
1 "
k n

k
= w"i : (10)
Due to the geographically symmetric location of the districts, we set
ij   1 "ij =
(
 2 [0; 1] if i 6= j
1 if i = j
;
which is a measure of how free trade is. Its value is one when trade is free and
zero when trade is prohibitively costly. There are three equilibrium conditions (10)
and three unknowns: w1, w2 and w3. However, one of the three equations in (10)
is redundant by Walraslaw. We set w1 = 1 by choosing the wage in district 1 as
the numéraire. As is standard in the New Economic Geography literature, it can be
shown that there is a unique solution, namely (w1; w2; w3) = (1; w2; w

3).
The indirect equilibrium utility (with a xed distribution of consumers) is given
by:
ui =
wi
P i
=
wih
1
"c
P3
j=1 ji
 
wj
1 "
Lj
i 1
1 "
:
It can also be shown that if Li > Lj, then wi > w

j and u

i > u

j . This is called the
market size e¤ect: the nominal and real wages are higher in the larger country.
2.2 The political sector
There are two types of elections, namely national elections and local elections. For
national elections, every consumer votes. For local elections, the alternatives are
chosen in each district independently. Only the residents of a district vote in the
local election for that district. We formulate two models, one with only a national
election, and one with only local elections. We adopt the framework of Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1997) for the political sector. There are two alternatives in any
election, A and Q. Let  2 fA;Qg. A preference parameter for a voter is given by
x 2 [ 1; 1], whereas the state is given by s 2 [0; 1]. The set of voter types is denoted
by X = [ 1; 1].3 The probability distribution over consumer types is given by F (if it
3In the terminology of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), there is only one information service.
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has a density, call it f), whereas the common prior over states is given by G (if it has a
density, call it g). Dene the utility from the political sector of type x from alternative
 in state s to be v(; s; x). We assume that v(s; x)  v(A; s; x)   v(Q; s; x) is
continuous and increasing in s and x.
The total utility of a consumer in district i of type x is abbreviated as
Uxi  ui + v:
Each voter receives a signal  2 f1; :::;Mg at the beginning of the political stage,
before voting, but after the economic stage. Denote by p( j s) the probability that
a consumer receives signal  in state s.
2.3 Timing of the game
All players have perfect foresight. The timing of the game is as follows. First,
the rms and consumers locate themselves in the three districts, knowing what lies
ahead. The agents cannot relocate after this step. Then economic equilibrium in the
districts is achieved. Next, each consumer receives a signal about the alternatives
in the political sector. Then they simultaneously vote over the two alternatives,
the winner determined by majority rule. For national elections, the outcome is
independent of the district of residence. For local elections, the outcome is specic
to each of the three districts. This is equilibrium in the political sector. Finally, all
players receive their utility payo¤s. We seek the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in
weakly undominated strategies of this game.
Notice that for national elections, only the economic sector matters in the choice
of location, so the game reduces to a standard New Economic Geography model.
Hence, we focus on local elections.
2.4 Equilibrium
Denition 1 A strategy prole is a measurable map  = (1; 2) where 1 : X  !
f1; 2; 3g and 2 : X  f1; 2; 3g  f1; :::;Mg  ! [0; 1]. Here, 1 denotes the strategy
at stage 1, the economic stage, whereas 2 denotes the strategy at stage 2, the political
stage. In general, the range of 2 denotes a mixed strategy where 0 is a pure strategy
vote for A whereas 1 is a vote for Q.
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In stage 1, each consumer (of any type) chooses a location. In stage 2, they vote.
We face a technical issue here that is faced by most working on information ag-
gregation in elections. In general, models with a nite number of voters are used due
to division by zero in applying Bayesrule when there is a continuum of voters. In
other words, the event that a person is pivotal when there is a continuum of voters
often has probability zero, so conditioning on this event is not possible. One option
to address this problem is to use regular conditional probabilities, but that is not
possible in our context. The alternative that we (and the literature) use is specied
as follows.
The rst stage of the game proceeds as an economy and game with a continuum
of players. This yields a population distribution in each of the three districts. For
national elections, votes from all districts are counted. For local elections, only votes
from a district are counted for the election in that district. When there are local
elections, there is an outcome for each district.
Fix population distributions F1, F2, and F3 in districts 1, 2, and 3, respectively (if
there is a density f for F , then Fi has density fi for i = 1; 2; 3). For local elections
(national elections follow in an obvious way) we draw randomly and independently
N voters from each district using the appropriate district-wide distribution, where
N is exogenous. Focus on a district i and a symmetric strategy prole for the
district 2(; i; ). Following Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, p. 1034), for each
state s 2 [0; 1] we can calculate the updated posterior for the state, conditional on
a voter being pivotal, on the signal they receive, and on othersstrategies. Using
this posterior, we can compute expected utility from the two alternatives, namely
E[v(A; s; x) j 2; ] and E[v(Q; s; x) j 2; ]. A voter can choose Q or A. Mixed
strategies are dened in the obvious way. If the proportion of voters who choose Q is
larger than 1=2, then Q is the outcome. Otherwise, A is the outcome. Expectations
over the randomization are counted for mixed strategies.
A second stage N-equilibrium is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this
second stage of the game, where no consumer/voter uses a weakly dominated strategy.
Proposition 1 (actually the proof in the appendix) of Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1997) shows that such an equilibrium exists under their Assumption 1.
A second stage equilibrium is any limit point of second stage N -equilibria
11
where N tends to innity. Such exists if second stage N -equilibrium exists for each
N due to the following argument. Let N2 be a second stage N -equilibrium with
N voters drawn from Fi. If necessary, draw a converging subsequence so that for
i = 1; 2; 3:
R
X
N2 (x; i; )dFi converges for each .
4 This yields the expected number
of votes forQ given  at equilibrium. Then apply Fatous lemma in several dimensions
(see Hildenbrand, 1974, p. 69) to obtain a limit. The law of large numbers implies
that if this number exceeds 1
2
in district i, then given , the winner is Q. Otherwise,
it is A.5 Notice that the limit is not necessarily an equilibrium of the limiting game,
due to problems with division by zero mentioned above. Rather, it is the limit of
a sequence of equilibria for games with nitely many players, where the number of
players tends to innity.
Fix a strategy prole  = (1; 2). Fix a district i. At stage 2, the posterior over
states conditional on being pivotal in that district and observing signal  is denoted
by i(s j piv; 2; ). Then the explicit derivation of i can be found in Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1997, p. 1034) and below in section 4. The objective of a voter of
type x 2 X is given by
max
2fA;Qg
Z 1
0
v(; s; x)  i(s j piv; 2; )ds:
An equilibrium is the limit point of a sequence of subgame perfect, symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibria in this two stage game, where (almost) no consumer/voter
in the sequence of games uses a weakly dominated strategy.
Informally, an equilibrium is said to satisfy full information equivalence in
district i if the alternative that wins the election in that district is almost surely the
one that would have been chosen if the electorate in that district were fully informed
about the state s. The formal denition of full information equivalence is technical
because it relies on statements about the asymptotic properties of large but nite
elections, and can be found in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, p. 1042).
4Notice that for each N this is just a list of real numbers of xed, nite length, so such a
converging subsequence exists provided that the sequence is bounded. Here, each element of the
vector and sequence is in the unit interval.
5Of course, there is a continuity issue when the vote share converges to 12 from above as N !1
for some set of signals. But then a pivotal voter is indi¤erent between the two possible outcomes
of the election.
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2.5 Stability
To ease notation, we dene i = LiL . Take an equilibrium population distribution
(1; 

2; 

3) with indirect economic utility u

i and with indirect political expected util-
ity Evi (x) for i = 1; 2; 3. Let f

i be the equilibrium density of types in district i, and
let Si be its support. We say that the equilibrium is stable if
d
 
Uj   Ui

dj
=
d
 
Evj   Evi

dx
 dx
dj
+
d
 
uj   ui

dj

x2Si \Sj
< 0 for i; j = 1; 2; 3; i 6= j:
(11)
Here we are assuming that the economic equilibrium does change at the margin.
However, the marginal change in the distribution of voters in the districts does not
change the political equilibrium in either their origin or destination. The reason for
this asymmetry between sectors is as follows. On the one hand, in the economic
sector, even though no single consumer can a¤ect prices, the consumers who are
moved to a new district can observe that equilibrium prices, and thus their indirect
utility, actually change. We take the limit of the change in utility divided by the
measure of consumers moved as the measure of consumers goes to zero, resulting in
the derivative of indirect utilities with respect to population. On the other hand,
for the political sector, we are taking a di¤erent kind of limit, namely the limit of
voting equilibria when there are random draws from the electorate as the size of the
draw becomes large. When the distribution F has a density f , the probability that
any particular person is even chosen as a member of a nite draw is zero. Thus,
each individual agent does not think that their move to another district will a¤ect
the political outcome in either their origin or destination. (One can move a set
of positive measure between districts and take limits as both the size of the draw
and the measure of the set moved tend to zero. In that case, the order of limits is
important. Since the limit of the equilibria as the size of the draw tends to innity is
not necessarily an equilibrium of the limiting game, we must focus on a xed, nite
size of draw and take the limit as the measure of agents moved tends to zero rst,
then focus on the limit of such equilibria as the sample size tends to innity. In
essence, we are testing for stability of the equilibria of the games with nite random
draws of the electorate from the distribution rather than stability of the limit game.
The latter has ill-dened conditional probabilities of being pivotal.)
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If the supports dont overlap on an open set, dx
dj
= 1
fj
. If they overlap on an
open set, then on that open set, dx
dj
= 0.
3 Characterization of stable equilibrium and com-
parative statics
In order to study the comparative statics of equilibrium, we must be much more
specic about the political sector. There are several reasons for this. First, since
we want to be able to say something specic about the equilibrium distribution of
population, we must know more about the equilibrium in the political sector for each
given distribution of population, as agents can anticipate (at least in expectation)
what will happen politically in each individual district, given the population distri-
bution. The abstract framework of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) tells us that
equilibrium in mixed strategies exists and it has the form of a cutpoint equilibrium.
But for our application, it is very useful to have an equilibrium in pure strategies. So
we use one of their examples that does not t their general framework, namely their
Example 2, where for any distribution of population, equilibrium in pure strategies
exists, is unique, and (under some further conditions) satises full information equiv-
alence. The drawback of using this example is that since it does not satisfy their
assumptions, we cannot claim the same generality in our results as they do in their
paper.
A related issue pertaining to the modeling strategy concerns the fact that we have
made functional form assumptions for the New Economic Geography sector of the
model, for reasons detailed in that literature. This allows us to nd equilibrium in
that sector explicitly. If we were to use the general functional form we have specied
for the political sector, then although we could know about existence of equilibrium
and perhaps its general properties, we would not be exploiting the specic functional
form assumptions made in the economic sector, and thus we could not use this to
nd equilibrium explicitly. In other words, we waste the additional information
provided by functional form assumptions in the economic sector. With functional
form assumptions in the political sector as well, we have balanced the assumptions in
the two sectors so that we can exploit all of the functional form assumptions we use
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to nd equilibrium explicitly, and thus nd comparative statics explicitly.
Finally, there is the issue of existence of equilibrium in pure strategies when the
second stage equilibrium is not unique. In that case, the classical problem that
the equilibrium correspondence for the second stage equilibrium is not convex-valued
arises, so existence of equilibrium in pure strategies is not assured.
For national elections, existence of a unique equilibrium satisfying full information
equivalence follows directly from Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, Example 2).
Local election equilibrium for our example has the following features. Districts 1
and 3 are polarized, in that the outcome is always Q in district 1 and A in district 3,
independent of signals received by the inhabitants. District 2 is the swing district,
in that it satises full information equivalence. In equilibrium, some districts can be
empty, depending on the exogenous parameters. As in the literature on voting over
local public goods, a person at a boundary between the swing district and a polarized
district is just indi¤erent between always choosing one alternative for sure and the
state-dependent, full information equivalence outcome.
To see that the second stage N -equilibrium (or the voting equilibrium) is unique
in each district, we use the fact that equilibrium strategies are not weakly dominated
in a strong way, as in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997). For example, one might
think that in a national election, if everyone always votes for the same outcome
independent of state, then nobody is ever pivotal and this equilibrium does not
satisfy full information equivalence. The problem with this idea is that there are non-
equilibrium strategies that will make a non-extreme voter pivotal, and the strategy
that tells this voter to always vote for the same outcome is weakly dominated by a
state-dependent one.
Similarly, for the polarized districts, if one has a suggested equilibriumwhere
some person does not always vote for the same outcome, then there are non-equilibrium
strategies that will render this person pivotal in the district, and the strategy they
are using is weakly dominated by the strategy that tells them to always vote for the
same outcome.
Assume that the political utility v is given by
v(; s; x) = K   1
2
(x   x)2  

x +
1
2
  s
2
;
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where xA = 1 and xQ =  1. Then,
v(s; x)  v(A; s; x)  v(Q; s; x) = 2 ( 1 + x+ 2s) ;
which is similar to the examples in section 5 of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997).
Also assume that f(x) is uniform over [ 1; 1], g(s) = 1 for s 2 [0; 1], there are only
two signals so M = 2, and
p(1 j s) =
(
1   if s < 1=2
 if s > 1=2
,
where  < 1=2. Then, the probability that a randomly selected voter votes for Q in
state s is
t(s; ) =
2X
=1
p( j s)
Z
X
(x; )f(x)dx
=
(
(1  )F (x1) + F (x2) if s < 1=2
F (x1) + (1  )F (x2) if s > 1=2
(12)
from the denition of p( j s). The probability that a vote is pivotal in state s is
given by
Pr (piv j s; ) =
 
n
n=2
!
t(s; )n=2 [1  t(s; )]n=2 ;
where t(s; ) is given by (12).
Analogous to Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), let x1 and x2 be cutpoints, x1 >
x2, namely for x < x2 the voter always votes for Q, for x > x1 the voter always votes
for A, and for x2  x  x1 the voter uses a state-dependent strategy. Because of the
symmetric setting relative to x = 0, it must be that the cutpoints are symmetric: x1+
x2 = 0, implying that Pr (piv j s; ) as calculated above is constant for all s. Then,
the probability distribution over states conditional on being pivotal,  (s j piv; ), is
also constant, and hence, the probability distribution over states conditional on being
pivotal and observing signal  is reduced to
 (s j piv; ; ) =  (s j piv; ) p( j s)R 1
0
 (w j piv; ) p( j w)dw
=
p( j s)R 1
0
p( j w)dw:
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Because
 (s j piv; ; 1) =
(
1   if s < 1=2
 if s > 1=2
 (s j piv; ; 2) =
(
 if s < 1=2
1   if s > 1=2 ;
we have
E[s j piv; ; ] =
R 1
0
 (s j piv; ; ) sdsR 1
0
sds
=
(
1
4
(1 + 2) if  = 1
1
4
(3  2) if  = 2 :
Solving
E[v(x1; s) j piv; ; 1] =  1 + 2x1 + 2E[s j piv; ; 1] = 0
E[v(x2; s) j piv; ; 2] =  1 + 2x2 + 2E[s j piv; ; 2] = 0
respectively, we obtain the two cutpoints:
x1 =
1
2
   and x2 =   1
2
:
Plugging them into (12) yieldst(s; n)  12
 = 14 (1  2)2 :
Hence, the political expected utilities are computed as
E [v(Q; s; x)] =
Z 1
0
v(Q; s; x)ds = K   1
12
 
6x2 + 12x+ 19

E [v(A; s; x)] =
Z 1
0
v(A; s; x)ds = K   1
12
 
6x2   12x+ 19 :
In the case of full information equivalence,
E [v((s); s; x)] =
Z 1=2
0
v(Q; s; x)ds+
Z 1
1=2
v(A; s; x)ds = K   1
12
 
6x2 + 13

:
See Figure 1 for these political expected utilities.
For simplicity assume an axisymmetric distribution:
(L1; L2; L3) = (; 1  2; )  L
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District 1 always votes unanimously for Q and district 3 always votes unanimously
for A, whereas alternative Q is elected for s < 1=2 and alternative A is elected for
s > 1=2 in district 2, i.e.,
Ux1 = u1 + E [v(Q; s; x)]
Ux2 = u2 + E [v((s); s; x)]
Ux3 = u3 + E [v(A; s; x)] :
Due to symmetry, the necessary condition for interior equilibrium is given by
U()  Ux2   Ux1 jx=1  = 0:
(i) Full agglomeration at district 2 ( = 0)
Suppose all individuals are agglomerated at district 2. Plugging  = 0 into (10),
we have w =  1=", and thus,
U(0) =

L
"c
 1
" 1 
1   2" 1"(" 1)

  1
2
:
Full agglomeration is an equilibrium if U(0)  0. Solving U(0) = 0, we get the
agglomeration sustain point:
A =
8<:
h
1  1
2
 
"c
L
 1
" 1
i "(" 1)
2" 1 2 (0; 1) if 1 > 1
2
 
"c
L
 1
" 1
0 if 1  1
2
 
"c
L
 1
" 1
.
Hence, full agglomeration emerges only if the xed labor requirement is su¢ ciently
small relative to the mass of workers (1 > 1
2
 
"c
L
 1
" 1 ) and the transportation cost is
large enough (  A).
(ii) Stratied equilibrium with district 2 empty ( = 1=2)
Substituting  = 1=2 into (10) yields w =

2
1+
 1
"
. If
U(1=2) =

L
"c
 1
" 1
"

2" 1
"(" 1)

2
1 + 
 1
"
 

1 + 
2
 1
" 1
#
+
1
2
 0; (13)
then a distribution that is symmetric between districts 1 and 3 is an equilibrium.
Notice that the bracketed terms in (13) are non-positive and increasing in , reaching
a maximum of 0 at  = 1. The symmetric equilibrium is stratied for  < B,
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where the stratication point B is given by the unique solution to the equation
U(1=2) = 0. Assume that the xed labor requirement is small relative to the mass
of workers so that U(1=2) < 0 holds at  = 0. Then, like the full agglomeration
case, stratication emerges only if the xed labor requirement is small relative to the
mass of workers and the transportation cost is large enough ( < B). Otherwise,
individuals would migrate to district 2. Furthermore, at a stratied equilibrium, the
stability condition between districts 1 and 3
d
d3

U3   U1 j2=0;1=1 3;x=1 3

3=1=2
< 0 (14)
should hold. This is satised when " is not too small.
(iii) Partial agglomeration ( 2 (0; 1=2))
In this case, solve (10) and U() = 0 simultaneously with respect to  and w.
It can be shown numerically that  2 (0; 1=2) for large .
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium distribution (1; 

2; 

3) as a function of trade
freedom  given " = 5 and L=c = 100.6 Observe that there are multiple equilibria for
small  (< B).
The conclusion that should be drawn from this analysis is that for high and low
freedom of trade, stable equilibria where not everyone is in the same district occur.
Higher freedom of trade means location is less important for economic welfare, and
hence the equilibrium location of consumers is driven by the political sector. With low
trade freedom, either everyone is agglomerated in the same district, or the electorate
is polarized in two separate districts. For moderate trade freedom, everyone is
agglomerated in the same district, and the political outcome is state dependent. For
high trade freedom, all three districts are occupied in equilibrium. Two of the
districts are polarized, always voting for the same candidate or outcome independent
of state, whereas the occupants of the larger moderate district vote according to their
information.
6Note that if L=c is su¢ ciently large, the symmetricequilibrium is unstable for small . This
condition is somewhat similar to the black-hole condition that is standard in the New Economic
Geography.
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4 Information aggregation in local elections
Using Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, Example 2), full information equivalence
always holds in the national elections for this model, where every agent votes in the
same election. Thus, elections aggregate information e¤ectively, and we expect to
see relatively few corrupt politicians elected.
On the other hand, local elections have di¤erent properties in this model with
migration, where only the residents of a district have the opportunity to vote in that
districts election. In this model with 3 districts and, for example, high trade free-
dom, only one of the 3 features full information equivalence at equilibrium. This is
the largest district. The other two will always elect the same candidate, independent
of individual signals and information. In other words, these two districts are polar-
ized. The conclusion is that elections in larger geographical districts, called national
elections in our terminology, will lead to the election of less corrupt candidates in
those districts, whereas elections in smaller geographical districts, called local elec-
tions in our terminology, will lead to less information aggregation, and thus will lead
to the election of more corrupt candidates as representatives of those districts. This
matches the empirical evidence used as motivation for our work in the introduction.
Notice that the theory does not predict that corrupt o¢ cials will be elected in every
local district in every state of the world, but rather only for certain states of the world
in the more polarized districts. Thus, one cannot expect a low p-value for this test.
Ideally, we would want to use data from the US Congress to test this theory.
The reason is that Senate districts are quite large and contain the House districts
as subsets. However, there are data issues with this idea. Criminal convictions
of members of the US Congress for corruption, for example by the Public Integrity
Section of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice, are few. Although
they are made public in their annual reports, most of the convictions are of o¢ cials
in other branches of the federal government or of local o¢ cials. One could weaken
the standards and look only at ethics investigations by congressional committees, but
information about this is primarily condential or leaked. Actual data, for example
from the group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, is consistent
with our hypotheses, but rather imprecise.
Notice that the implication of the model that we apply to data has little to do
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with trade freedom, our comparative static parameter. Instead, it is based on the
characterization of equilibrium, and relies on the idea that mobile voters can polarize
the electorate endogenously in local as opposed to national elections, and polarization
implies that corrupt politicians are more likely to be elected.
5 Conclusions and extensions
We have constructed a model where politically polarized districts emerge endoge-
nously. One consequence is that full information equivalence holds for only one of
three districts in the local elections model, whereas it always holds in the national
elections model. We have interpreted the model for empirical purposes as a model
of politician corruption, and veried the informational implication of the theory in
data. This particular interpretation of the model was used so that we could apply it
easily to data. However, other interpretations of the uncertainty, such as the produc-
tivity or valence of the alternatives or candidates, are equally valid and perhaps more
interesting, but less amenable to empirical applications. For example, the two alter-
natives in the model could represent di¤erent levels (high and low) of a local public
good such as schooling, including appropriate taxes. The e¤ectiveness of the policies
might be unknown to voters, but they receive a signal about it. A big issue in trying
to take this interpretation of the model to data is that many variables are changing
as we observe the swing districts outcome changing, for example rents, wages, and
populations of the districts.
Full information equivalence is a casualty of free trade. The reason is that under
free trade, people sort themselves into districts, most of which are polarized. When
trade is more costly, people tend to agglomerate for economic reasons, resulting in
full information equivalence in the political sector.
It is interesting to discuss welfare in the context of this model. Originally, the
New Economic Geography, representing the economic side of our model, was designed
to answer the positive question: Why are there cities? The early literature shied
away from normative questions, though more recent literature has examined e¢ ciency.
Similarly, the literature on information aggregation in elections also tends to focus
on positive questions. There are reasons this has happened.
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In the context of the Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) model, under assumptions
that ensure full information equivalence, their model reduces to a standard political
model where all policies, specically A and Q, are Pareto optimal. As is standard
in many political economy models, this represents a purely redistributive game, and
thus welfare evaluation reduces to interpersonal utility comparisons. This is not
desirable. Since our model is an adaptation of the Feddersen-Pesendorfer model,
something similar happens here. An implication is that we cannot say that the
swing district features a higher level of e¢ ciency in provision of local public goods
than the other districts. Beyond interpersonal utility comparisons, when discussing
allocations that Pareto dominate equilibrium allocations but might not be equilibrium
allocations themselves, it is unclear what information structure to use for evaluation
of the political sector, for instance full information or a structure less informative to
agents.7
Finally, it is clear that welfare evaluations in our model will hinge on the relative
weight given to the economic and political sectors in the utility functions.
For all of these reasons, we eschew explicit welfare comparisons using our model.
If we were to use a model of local public goods in place of our New Economic
Geography model for the economic sector, it is likely that stratication would always
occur in equilibrium. Thus, it is likely that full information equivalence would
never hold in local elections.8 But there are also models of local public goods in
the literature, such as Epple and Platt (1998), that do not imply complete one-
dimensional stratication in equilibrium. Let us consider this model in a bit more
detail. There are two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity in this framework,
income and preferences. We wish to make 3 remarks. First, there is no theorem
on existence of equilibrium in this model. Second, as illustrated in Figure 3 of that
paper, if one considers income as our parameter x, there is some of every income
type in every jurisdiction due to preference heterogeneity, leading to no polarization
and full information equivalence. Finally, it makes less sense to us to look at a
comparative static on the variance of idiosyncratic preference heterogeneity than on
trade freedom, something that is observable.
Related to this, another variation of the model is of interest: combine a local public
7These ideas will not be novel to those who work in this literature, as they are part of the folklore.
8Such a model would predict very low p-values in the data presented in the introduction.
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good model with an NEG model. Actually, this represents another interpretation of
our model. In essence, local elections allow sorting and let mobile consumers obtain
their desired bundle of local public goods, in contrast with national elections. Thus,
in regional economies such as ours, consumers face a tradeo¤ between a local policy
match with their preferences, causing dispersion, and agglomeration for standard
NEG purposes. One can conclude that the benets of Tiebout sorting are a casualty
of trade barriers, though this has no implication for overall welfare from both sectors.
The equilibria of this model would be second best or worse. It would be possible to
formulate a combination Tiebout and NEG model with no uncertainty to make this
precise, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
With only 2 instead of 3 districts, the comparative statics reduce to the left hand
half of Figure 2. That is, when trade costs are high, there is an equilibrium with full
agglomeration of agents in one district, and an equilibrium with half the population in
each district, sorted by voter type. For lower trade cost, only the stratied equilibria
survive. Thus, our main conclusion still holds. With more than 3 districts, it is
di¢ cult to calculate the second stage (political) equilibria in the districts.
Many extensions of our work come to mind. It would be interesting to allow
the alternatives or candidates A and Q move with the composition of the district,
migrating toward the median or at least toward the endpoints of the support of the
population distribution in a district. We conjecture that this would be possible if we
force the candidates to move rst and commit, before populations are determined.
However, if we allow candidates to move after migration occurs, we run into the
problem that this model has not been solved, to our knowledge, even in the national
elections (or exogenous population) case. Castanheira (2003) makes some progress
in a related model.
In the spirit of Maug and Yilmaz (2002), for the local elections model we could
assume that each district elects a delegate corresponding to A or Q who would then
vote in a legislature according to the wishes of the district, with the winner determined
by the majority but applying to all districts. Thus, the outcome would not be district-
specic. In our 3 district model with relatively free trade, there would be 3 delegates.
The pivotal delegate would be determined by district 2, satisfying full information
equivalence, so the outcome in the legislature would also satisfy full information
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equivalence. In contrast with Maug and Yilmaz (2002), we do not require that the
same alternative win a majority in all 3 districts.
Our utility function has equal weights on the utility derived from the economic
and political sectors, and is additive across the sectors. It would be interesting
to consider more general utility functions, in particular asymmetric weights on the
sectors, to see if it produces districts that might be asymmetric in various senses.
An interesting conjecture is that higher transportation cost into and out of a
district leads to isolation, lower population, and polarized electoral outcomes. To
analyze this conjecture, the New Economic Geography part of the model would have
to be extended to allow asymmetries in either transportation cost or distance. This
is not easy; see Ago et al. (2006) and Bosker et al. (2010).
Finally, it would be interesting to allow politicians to choose the transportation
infrastructure. This involves the same complications as making transportation cost
asymmetric, and more.
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Figure 1:  Political expected utilities with K=10 
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Figure 2:  Equilibrium distributions when 100/and5 == cLε   
Dotted arrow is 1L , solid arrow is 2L  and dashed arrow is 3L  
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